The next two meetings of our English-Speaking Colloquium on Analytic Philosophy will take place this Friday and Saturday, January 20-21.
January 20 (Friday), 16.30, room 308.
Evgeny Borisov will give a talk with the title
Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives and the Problem of Belief Ascriptions De Re
Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives (LD) proved to be a handy instrument in semantics of belief ascriptions. In particular, it provides an elegant solution to the problem of conflicting belief ascriptions de re which contain indexical expressions. What makes LD relevant to this problem is a technical apparatus accommodating the cognitive aspect of indexicals. I am going to expose the formal machinery of LD and show how it can be helpful in dealing with problems raised by doxastic contexts.
January 21 (Saturday), 12.30, room 519.
Daria Slaushevskaya will give a talk entitled
Davidson’s Anomalous Monism
The talk focuses on principles of Davidson’s theory of anomalous monism. I show that it is based on three claims — the principle of causal interaction, the claim of the nomological character of causality, and the principle of anomalism of the mental. In contrast to philosophers who hold that these claims contradict each other, Davidson holds that they are compatible and, taken together, provide an account of freedom of human actions. This distinguishes Davidson’s theory from strict determinism.
Everybody is welcome!